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A B S T R A C T
A “digital revolution” in agriculture is underway. Advanced technologies like sensors, artificial intelligence, and robotics are increasingly being promoted as a means
to increase food production efficiency while minimizing resource use. In the process, agricultural digitalization raises critical social questions about the implications
for diverse agricultural labourers and rural spaces as digitalization evolves. In this paper, we use literature and field data to outline some key trends being observed at
the nexus of agricultural production, technology, and labour in North America, with a particular focus on the Canadian context. Using the data, we highlight three
key tensions observed: rising land costs and automation; the development of a high-skill/low-skilled bifurcated labour market; and issues around the control of digital
data. With these tensions in mind, we use a social justice lens to consider the potential implications of digital agricultural technologies for farm labour and rural
communities, which directs our attention to racial exploitation in agricultural labour specifically. In exploring these tensions, we argue that policy and research must
further examine how to shift the trajectory of digitalization in ways that support food production as well as marginalized agricultural labourers, while pointing to key
areas for future research—which is lacking to date. We emphasize that the current enthusiasm for digital agriculture should not blind us to the specific ways that new
technologies intensify exploitation and deepen both labour and spatial marginalization.
1. Introduction
Digitalization, automation and AI are of increasing importance to
farmers, scholars, and decision-makers in the field of food and agriculture.
As social and environmental concerns, such as income inequity and climate
change, intersect with mounting questions around the future of labour,
work, and space in a digital age, significant gaps are apparent in agri-food
research—some of which piqued initial discussions around the need for this
paper. With critical gaps concerning the sociology of labour, rurality, and
digitalization specifically, this paper investigates agricultural digitalization
and automation and its potential impacts on labour and rural communities
in industrial agri-food contexts like Canada. Throughout the paper, we
consider the extent to which digitalization and automation1 may disrupt, or
further entrench, the ‘productivist’ paradigm (Burton, 2004)2 and how this
may impact the rural spaces and labour hierarchies that underpin it—with a
focus on marginalized and racialized labourers.
In agri-food, digital technologies are being proposed by industry and
decision-makers as a solution to growing social and environmental crises.
For instance, the Canadian government is currently investing in ‘climate
smart’ and ‘precision’ technologies that “will contribute to Canada's place as
a world leader in agricultural clean technology, helping farmers to develop
new and efficient uses of energy, while also protecting our environmental
resources and mitigating climate change” (Agriculture and Agri-Food
Canada, 2018). The argument by some is that combining digital tools (such
as GPS, sensors and data modelling software) with automated technologies
(such as smart tractors, drones and robots) will help farmers be more precise
with inputs (i.e. seeds, water, fertilizers and pesticides) while enhancing
their knowledge of agro-ecological conditions (including weather and
landscape interactions and soil and plant health). Some researchers, policy
makers, and commentators suggest that the combination of these
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1 When we refer to digitalization of agriculture, we are referring to a number of high tech tools that gather data to help farmers make more site-specific and
informed management decisions. Automation, or mechanization, on the other hand, has been an ongoing trend in agriculture and other industries for decades
(Friedmann, 1978; Wolf and Buttel, 1996). The novel aspects of the current developments in automations are the increased use of robotics for jobs that were
previously only capable by human hands, such as milking a cow or picking sensitive fruits like strawberries.
2 Productivist agriculture is defined by Burton (2004) as a model “whereby emphasis was placed on maximising food production through the application of
intensive production approaches and increasing biochemical application” (p 195).
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technologies will increase profits, improve the livelihoods of farmers, en-
hance the health and wellbeing of livestock, and reduce environmental
impacts (Eastwood et al., 2012; Gebbers and Adamchuk, 2010; Wolfert
et al., 2017).
As agricultural technologies rapidly advance, predictions over the
future of labour and rurality diverge. For instance, other scholars, ac-
tivists, and farmers argue that agricultural technologies entrench land
degradation, capital accumulation, and the exploitation of marginalized
and racialized labourers by land owners, governments and corporations
(CBAN, 2015; McMichael, 2013; Weis, 2010). In turn, several social
questions arise concerning how digital agricultural technologies will
impact labour dynamics and rural communities in the future. Scholars
are asking how digital agriculture and the concomitant development of
new productivity-increasing technologies fit into a suite of processes
that are dramatically changing food-producing landscapes and the
communities that support them. This question sits amidst a backdrop of
literature that has highlighted how a digital divide, i.e. unequal geo-
graphic access to information and communication technologies (ICT),
has led to uneven socioeconomic development outcomes (Roberts et al.,
2017; Salemink et al., 2017). Within this context, some scholars con-
clude that agricultural digitalization and automation will inevitably
reinforce social, economic, and racial inequities in labour, skills de-
velopment, and rural spatiality (Bronson and Knezevic, 2016a, 2016b),
just as many digital technologies already reflect existing social divides
(Basu and Chakraborty, 2011).
Others argue that, if done well, digitalization can positively con-
tribute to growth in rural communities by creating new workplace
opportunities (Ivus and Boland, 2015; Pant and Hambly Odame, 2016).
Recent labour and workforce reports argue that Canada's agri-food in-
dustry is growing rapidly and is creating a surplus of well-paid jobs;
meanwhile, many such jobs are unfilled, highlighting a disjuncture
between skills and labour availability (Advisory Council on Economic
Growth, 2017; Ontario Agricultural College, 2017). A study by the
Ontario Agricultural College (OAC) indicates that there are currently
four jobs for every graduate entering Ontario's food and agricultural
sector, and that this labour gap is expected to grow (Ontario
Agricultural College, 2017). The Canadian government argues that
these jobs can help build a more inclusive workforce if sufficient in-
vestments are made in life-long training, education, and skills devel-
opment for currently marginalized groups (e.g. low-income workers,
new immigrants, Indigenous peoples, women, and persons with dis-
abilities) (Advisory Council on Economic Growth, 2017). While this is a
notable goal, given what we know about uneven digital development
and marginalization, key questions become: 1) How might these tech-
nologies restructure labour in agriculture, for better or worse, and re-
shape rural communities in North America, and 2) How could policy
and research help support more equitable development for currently
marginalized groups in agri-food?
To explore these questions, this paper draws from literature shaping
this debate alongside research with scholars, farmers, and practitioners
on the topic of digital agriculture and automation. We begin by pro-
viding an overview of the historical trajectory of labour and rural
communities in North American agriculture. Next, we outline the cur-
rent context and future projections for labour and rurality as agri-
cultural technologies evolve. We then outline our methodological ap-
proach to the paper, then move to our findings, which are divided into
three themes surrounding digital agricultural technologies and its im-
plications for labour. We highlight three key tensions: rising land costs
and automation; the development of a high-skill/low-skilled bifurcated
labour market; and issues around the control of digital data. From
there, we discuss the sociopolitical landscape through which agri-
cultural digitalization is evolving, and consider its implications for
marginalized labour and spatiality specifically. We close by considering
potential research and policy directions that will help to build a more
socially just agri-food sector as digital ag-tech forges ahead. More em-
pirical research on this issue is necessary, in turn, we highlight areas
that would particularly benefit from additional research. The main goal
of this approach, and the paper more broadly, is to open up discussion
for future work within a currently under-researched topic.
2. Background
2.1. Historical contexts shaping current realities
Prior to the 1940s, North American agricultural production de-
pended primarily on farm families. A distinguishing feature of these
settler farm families3 was their ability to self-exploit and self-reproduce
via ‘free’ family labour in a climate of expanding world markets and
mass production (Friedmann, 1978). Since the 1940s, however, the
proportion of family labour to wage labour has declined significantly
due to increased urban employment opportunities and increasing
pressures for farm commercialization and consolidation (Basok, 2002;
Kandel, 2008; Wall, 1994). The rising cost of farm inputs, alongside
buyer-driven supply chains and the liberalization of trade in interna-
tional markets, has created a ‘cost-price squeeze’ for many producers,
who either abandon farming or increase the scale of their operation by
investing in more land and/or farm implements (Basok, 2002). Between
1950 and 2002 the average farm size in the U.S. more than doubled
from 216 to 444 acres, while the total number of farms declined from
5.5 to 2.1 million (Hoppe and Korb, 2005). Similarly, average farm size
in Canada grew from around 250 acres in 1950 to 820 acres in 2016
while the total number of farms fell from around 700,000 to under
195,000 (Statistics Canada, 2016). The concentration of land and ca-
pital into fewer producers, combined with advances in agricultural
technology, has led to an overall decrease in farm labour and a growing
reliance on a nonfamily workforce to satisfy outstanding labour de-
mands (Basok, 2002; Kandel, 2008; Wall, 1994). In order to expand,
farmers must minimize their input and/or their labour costs. Given the
rising cost of on-farm inputs, to remain economically viable, labour
intensive farm operations rely on the exploitation of cheap labour.
Economic restructuring in high-income Western countries in-
tensifies structural demands for cheap agricultural labour, demands
that are increasingly met by migrant labour (Basok, 2002; Kandel,
2008; Labour Task Force, 2013; Leach and Winson, 1995). Urban
economic expansion has cut rural unemployment rates, while better-
paying industrial and service sector job opportunities—coupled with a
generally unfavourable attitude towards farm employment opportuni-
ties—have drained rural communities of a permanent and stable local
agricultural wage labour pool. Social barriers to rural immigration,
alongside rural exodus and aging population significantly impacts rural
communities, and manifests in a declining local tax base, weakened
public services, and depressed economic activity (Desmarais and
Wittman, 2014). In turn, while workplace diversification is growing in
rural communities, this is not necessarily being reflected in rural
community settlement (Leach and Winson, 2002; Reimer, 2007).
In the absence of a readily exploitable domestic wage labour pool,
North American agriculture has been characterized by a growing de-
mand for temporary migrant wage labour (Basok, 2002; Bélanger and
Candiz, 2014; Guthman, 2004; Kandel, 2008; Labour Task Force, 2013;
Martin, 2002, 2003; Preibisch, 2012). The exploitation of migrant and
racialized workers in Canada through federal programming and im-
migration policies highlights the state's role in harnessing an ex-
ploitable labour pool for capital accumulation in agriculture. The Ca-
nadian government established the first temporary migrant labour
program in 1966 with the temporary admission of Caribbean seasonal
agricultural workers. This did not solve the labour shortage, so the
3 Settlers are broadly defined as those who occupy Indigenous lands. This
term also intersects with racism to shape the social, economic, political and
cultural privileges that white settlers have gained specifically, in contrast to
people of colour (Byrd, 2011; Kepkiewicz and Dale, 2018; Thobani, 2007).
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government introduced the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program
(SAWP) in 1974. By 2015, agricultural worker programs accounted for
over 50,000 migrant workers in Canada (Weiler, 2018).
While the SAWP is the primary form of institutionalized labour
exploitation in Canadian agriculture at present (Weiler et al., 2017),
there is also a long history of both migrant and Indigenous labour ex-
ploitation (Friedmann, 1978; Laliberte, 2006). For instance, through
the ‘grab-a-hoe Indian’ program, sugar beet farmers filled labour
shortages by working alongside the federal government to force thou-
sands of Indigenous peoples onto beet farms under grueling working
and living conditions with poor access to food and water and very little
pay (Carreiro, 2017; Laliberte, 2006; Laliberte and Satzewich, 1998).
The industry operated across western Canada from the 1940s until the
1980s, allowing sugar beet farmers, and the industry as a whole, to
accumulate significant capital.
Indigenous farm labour was augmented through—and later over-
taken by—the migrant worker program to support farmers in exploiting
labour for capital accumulation amidst the push by governments and
corporations for farmers to ‘get big or get out’. Notably, while the mi-
grant worker program has expanded, no concurrent programming was
developed to support marginalized peoples in Canada to access fair and
socially just employment. For instance, while Indigenous communities
have called on the Canadian government to fund comprehensive
Indigenous labour and employment programming, this has yet to
happen.
Racialized labour continues to be a necessary condition for the ex-
pansion and flexibility of agricultural industries in North America
(Alkon and Agyeman, 2011). Agricultural employers harness a com-
pliant, low-wage labour force according to seasonal labour input de-
mands through temporary migrant labour programs in Canada and
undocumented immigrants in the U.S. (Guthman, 2004; Kandel, 2008;
Preibisch, 2010). These workers are crucial to the development of in-
tensive horticultural and livestock industries (e.g., Boyd and Watts,
1997; Friedland et al., 1981); in 2008, hired farmworkers made up one-
third of the estimated three million people employed in U.S. agriculture
and over half are estimated to be ‘unauthorized’ immigrants (Kandel,
2008; Haspel, 2017). In Canada, primary agricultural occupations make
up nearly 60 percent of all temporary foreign work positions
(Employment and Social Development Canada, 2017). The remainder
of the agricultural workforce is composed of (1) self-employed farmers,
their unpaid family members, and year-round employees (Kandel,
2008; Statistics Canada, 2012), and (2) interns, apprentices, and vo-
lunteers, who are an important source of nonpaid labour for small-scale
and alternative ecologically-oriented farming operations in particular
(Ekers et al., 2015).
2.1.1. Projections of agricultural labour in the rural economy under
technological change
Despite state interventions to build labour supply, supply gaps are
an ongoing issue for Canadian and U.S. agriculture. The Conference
Board of Canada (2016) projects that low-skilled labour shortages will
reach 113,000 people by 2025 as a result of an aging farm population,
seasonal fluctuations of employment, the rural location of employment
opportunities, and a negative cultural perception of farm work. With
difficulties recruiting and retaining domestic workers, temporary mi-
grant wage labour is projected to continue to increase over the coming
years (Labour Task Force, 2013; The Conference Board of Canada,
2016).
Meanwhile, the continued and projected use of temporary migrant
labour sits uneasily with principles of labour justice (Alkon and
Agyeman, 2011; Allen, 2010). Temporary farmworkers are dis-
advantaged as they are less likely to speak English or French, or possess
a legal work permit (Kandel, 2008). Moreover, unemployment rates for
hired farm labourers are disproportionately high, while weekly earn-
ings are nearly half those of other wage and salary workers. While
temporary migrant labour is supported through government programs,
workers are subject to precarious livelihood and working conditions
(Horgan and Liinamaa, 2017; Walia, 2010; Robillard et al., 2018), in-
cluding long shifts and hard labour, limited overtime compensation or
holiday and vacation pay (Kandel, 2008; Paz, 2008). This can include
hazardous working conditions, with extreme variability in health and
safety provisions and training (Grez, 2006; Paz, 2008; Preibisch and
Otero, 2014). In Canada, temporary workers are contracted to work on
a single farm each season, with their return in subsequent years being
contingent on receiving a positive evaluation from their employer. With
restricted mobility and the threat of replacement, workers cannot ef-
fectively negotiate their working conditions or initiate any form of
collective action against their employers, and therefore experience high
levels of occupational insecurity (Horgan and Liinamaa, 2017;
Preibisch, 2012; Reid-Musson, 2017).
Although wages from temporary migrant labour programs may
allow workers to invest in inexpensive land, business, education,
housing, clothing, medical treatments, or other amenities in their home
communities (Basok, 2003), data suggest that workers have restricted
“upward mobility” and that most employees in the unskilled labour
streams are poor or jobless when they are “aged out” of work (Martin,
2002). Meanwhile, Canadian federal citizenship policies, which could
improve work and livelihood prospects for migrant labourers (Preibisch
and Otero, 2014), do not favour low-skilled labourers (The Conference
Board of Canada, 2016). Critics of contemporary Canadian migrant
labour policy note that the persistence of highly exploitative forms of
migrant labour juxtaposed with restricted opportunities for permanent
residency reflect a legacy of state racism and ongoing patterns and
processes of colonization (Grez, 2006; Perry, 2012).
While progressive movements work to end exploitative labour ar-
rangements, agricultural labour continues to be shaped by a persistent
structural demand for low-wage seasonal labour to achieve further
capitalization (American Farm Bureau, 2006; Kandel, 2008; Labour
Task Force, 2013; The Conference Board of Canada, 2016). It is also
important to note the susceptibility of North American horticultural
sectors, where labour costs constitute nearly 40 percent of total farm
operation costs (Kandel, 2008; Vineland Research and Innovation,
2013) and where fluctuations in factors affecting the labour supply,
such as changes to immigration policies, would disproportionately
disrupt their operations (as we are seeing under the current U.S. ad-
ministration's crackdown on immigration) (Baertlein and Huffstutter,
2017; Shanker, 2018).
As we will explore in this paper, technology may disrupt these ex-
isting labour dynamics in agriculture. For instance, to curb high labour
demand, some horticultural operators are beginning to invest in new
automated labour-saving technologies in the areas of transplanting,
pesticide application, and grading (Vineland Research and Innovation,
2013). Automation is projected to rise to 28 percent overall by 2030,
while the ‘projected potential’ for automation could reach 52 percent4
(Scott, 2017). Farm manual labour and pesticide applicators are pro-
jected to be most highly automated by 2030 (97%). Farmers, ranchers,
and agricultural managers, on the other hand, are least likely to be
automated (4.7%).
Alongside these projections, there has been a global proliferation of
financialization and venture capital investments related to emerging
digital agricultural technologies. In 2017, for instance, agtech invest-
ment reached a new record of $1.5 billion and, since 2012, venture
capital investment in agtech has grown by 80 percent annually (Kukutai
and Maughan, 2018; Sparapani, 2017). The agtech investment land-
scape is now overflowing with start-ups promising to create, disrupt,
and expand markets in the areas of gene editing and biotech; data
analysis; AI and robotic design; as well as cloud-based technologies and
marketplaces. Notably, many of these emerging start-ups are being
4 This is based on an Oxford study using data from US labour markets
(Benedikt Frey and Osborne, 2013).
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rapidly acquired by agri-food and retail giants such as John Deere, Case
IH, Bayer (which has now merged with Monsanto), Walmart and Nestlé
(AgFunderNews, 2018).
Expected job growth in agricultural science, engineering, and other
high-level positions presents a concern for rural agricultural employees
in particular. Although it has been noted that digitalization, such as
deployment of broadband, can bring service sector jobs to the rural
economy (Ivus and Boland, 2015), it is unclear how jobs in primary
agricultural production will be impacted. As Kristal and Cohen (2017)
note, skill-biased technological change may contribute to wage in-
equality as demand for high-skilled, technological-savvy workers re-
sults in stagnant wages for less-skilled workers. These trends are com-
plicated by the politics surrounding farmer debt and capitalization—as
crop prices remain low, many farmers may find themselves unable to
keep up with the capital-intensive investments necessary for digital
farming technologies. In rural spaces characterized by persistent digital
(Park, 2017; Warren, 2007) and labour (Binford, 2009; Reid-Musson,
2017; Weiler et al., 2017) inequities, a key question for scholars is, how
might some actors exploit the opportunities afforded by emerging di-
gital technologies, and how might others lose out? While further em-
pirical observation is required to answer this question with certainty,
the goal of this paper is to identify the current landscape of digitali-
zation in agri-food, and consider the implications of this landscape for
marginalized agricultural labourers and the rural communities that
they work within.
3. Methodology
This paper emerges from an initial interdisciplinary workshop at the
University of Guelph that brought together experts to identify and
discuss key areas of emerging research priorities in rural and agri-
cultural sectors. This workshop, with 20 scholars from diverse dis-
ciplines who are working across the fields of agri-food, digitalization
and rurality (faculty, postdoctoral fellows, and graduate students) fo-
cused on discussions of trends and gaps in current analyses of these
issues. Workshop participants were invited based on their research
expertise; we aimed for interdisciplinarity because it is critical to un-
derstand these complex issues through diverse theoretical and analy-
tical lenses. The workshop discussions were recorded and coded to
identify themes.
Subsequent to the workshop, the lead researchers created a biblio-
graphy of peer-reviewed scholarly papers pertaining to the themes
emergent from the workshop, including agriculture, digitalization, la-
bour, and rural space. We used automation and labour-saving tech-
nologies as the main components of digital agriculture to organize the
analysis, focusing on precision-tech, robotics, sensors, data software
systems, drones, and mobile phones, as opposed to communication and
transparency technologies like RFID chips or social media platforms.
In order to illustrate some of the key themes and questions that
emerged from the workshop and the subsequent literature review, we
also incorporated data from two studies undertaken by Rotz (2018) and
Duncan (2018). Emily Duncan's study explored the adoption of digital
agricultural technologies by crop and dairy farmers in Ontario. In 33
interviews with farmers who have adopted digital agricultural tech-
nologies and retailers selling them, it became clear that participants
were concerned about how these technologies can address the nature of
farm work and agricultural labour gaps. The second study conducted by
Sarah Rotz (2018) considered race, settler colonialism, and the division
of labour, focusing on Indigenous and migrant workers in southern
Ontario. The relevant data from this study included five interviews with
farmers who employ migrant labourers, as well as interview and focus
group data with 20 food activists and representatives of labour and
agri-food organizations. We have incorporated data from these two
seemingly disparate studies in the analysis, because both studies de-
monstrated a larger question concerning the impact of digital agri-
cultural technologies on marginalized and racialized labour and rural
communities that requires urgent, and more in-depth scholarly atten-
tion.
4. Findings
Our analysis of the workshop, review, and field research data de-
monstrate three key, emerging issues that highlight tensions in the re-
lationship between agricultural digitization and farm labour. Each of
these have potential implications for marginalized and racialized labour
specifically, which should help direct future research. First, rising land
costs have put a squeeze on farmers, and some farmers are adopting
automation as a way to reduce labour input costs. Second, while digital
technologies are creating new high-skilled employment opportunities in
agriculture, they are displacing some forms of low-skilled migrant la-
bour. Third, labour is being impacted by the production of data itself
and is shaped by new relations between players vis-à-vis access to and
control over digital data.
One of the key conclusions drawn from the literature is that rising
land prices and input costs alongside stagnant commodity prices have
driven farmers of all shapes and sizes to minimize labour costs by any
means possible (Fine et al., 1994; Woodhouse, 2010).
In turn, where possible, human labour costs have been cut by au-
tomating manual labour tasks or by exploiting migrant labour. This
conundrum is not new. It is what drove the perceived ‘need’ to establish
the seasonal agricultural workers program in the first place. However,
while farmers have increasingly turned to seasonal worker programs as
a solution to the perennial cost-price squeeze, some are now seeking
alternative solutions via automation technology.5 What is less obvious,
however, is how technologies may allow some farmers to move from
more expensive skilled labour, to temporary migrant labour. In one
example, a retailer of precision agricultural technologies noted how
automated steering made it more conducive to hiring migrant workers
who may not have relevant on-farm skills (i.e. tractor steering):
(Automated) steering … basically, you have to have it [in order] to
do the job of farming anymore. But, a lot of the vegetable growers
bring in offshore labor, and basically, they sit on the tractor and the
tractor does all the driving. And the job is consistent and accurate all
the time. You don't have to save a specific duty for a specific person.
The technology takes care of that.
Additionally, rising land and input prices are increasing the op-
portunity costs of non-productive land use, which may include habitat
remediation and ecological biodiversity, wind breaks, or storage
buildings and worker housing. In this case, it is the land needed for
worker housing that can contribute to making migrant labour less
feasible and attractive, particularly if rental markets are not viable al-
ternatives. An apple farmer who employs SAWP labourers explained,
Labour is less reliable. Rents are astronomical. If you don't have on-
site housing, rents are astronomical for anybody up here, which is a
really big problem. A lack of public transportation again is really
bad if you're trying to hire workers and they don't have their own
vehicle. [My husband] says, ‘What about some of these Syrians’, but
I said, ‘How are they going to get here? I'm not running to Owen
Sound twice a day.’
Conversely, in agricultural industries that are less amenable to mi-
grant labour—primarily because they are not seasonal—such as the
dairy industry, automation is shifting labour demand and changing the
5 Automation technologies include robots, drones, autonomous tractors, and
artificial intelligence that replace human labour in manual farm tasks. To be
fair, we note that not all farmers are turning to technology. To deal with the
economic squeeze in agriculture, many are moving toward differentiated,
value-added and niche markets, such as organic, biodynamic and specialty
products.
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work environment. As one retailer of robotic milking machines ex-
plains, “So let's say you have a hired man to milk 100 cows, well maybe
you can milk your 100 cows now by yourself if you put in robots. So
there is definitely some labour savings.” Certainly, for larger dairies, the
labour component is still critical; yet the adoption of automated tech-
nologies changes the nature of employment for rural labourers. A dairy
producer describes the shift in her employment strategy since the
adoption of robotics, highlighting a nexus of working conditions, labour
retention, and a shift toward higher skills,
I think people assume that you can really cut down on your labour
hours and that is something that they market a lot with the robots. I
don't completely agree with that. So we had nine workers before,
but you have to think about the fact that they were shift workers.
They did 3–4-h shifts, so they were not nine full-timers, they were
nine part-timers. Now what we have is five full-timers and one part-
time employee. But also in that time – we had 330 cows when we
started and now we have 500 milking, so we have to allow for that
growth as well. Our labour may have decreased a little bit but … we
didn't choose to do it to decrease our labour. We chose to do it to
have better labour retention and a better work environment. So, you
will decrease your labour slightly but I think the biggest benefit is
that you can hire more dedicated, more skilled people. Part-timers,
there is a lot of turn-over. Full-timers we are able to retain, and that
was the biggest reason. I don't want to be hiring someone new all the
time, and it is also hard when shifts were milking cows – it is just
hard to make it sound appealing. We truly stand behind the fact that
the work that we have is interesting and you can allow a person to
take courses and to learn more on the job and to have varied tasks
and to be more integrated and more responsible for certain aspects
of the farm, and I think that is the way that we can retain our people.
Another dairy farmer raised similar perspectives, stating,
Milking probably isn't the most exciting job if all you are doing is
attaching milkers to cows for three hours straight. So, we were also
looking for a lifestyle change where you wouldn't be tied to having
to milk cows at set times. And milking robots basically take care of
that. There is still all the other aspects of farming that you have to
take care of, but at least the most labour intense, repetitive part –
the robot does. Our goal with switching from the parlour to the
robots was that we could hire more skilled people because they
wouldn't just be milking, they would be in charge of more animal
health and animal welfare. And we could offer a better working
environment for them. We have completely changed the way we
hire and train and the way we have our work schedules for our team.
The second theme that emerged as a key tension is that while
technologies are creating new opportunities for the farming sector, a
significant number of migrant labour positions will be displaced via
automation or higher skilled jobs, which raises pertinent ethical ques-
tions. As the cost of technology declines, automation technology—such
as fruit and vegetable pruners and harvesters—is becoming economic-
ally comparable to migrant farm labour. Moreover, replacing migrant
labour with technology allows farmers to side-step the social and po-
litical complexities of migrant labour management. Although the in-
stitutional and policy structures of the migrant worker program have
already removed most of the social and political accountability (e.g. for
worker safety and security) from farmers, automating farm tasks ab-
solves farmers of any further public pressure to improve opportunities
and livelihoods for migrant farm workers (Paz, 2008). On one hand,
reducing the structural need for highly-exploitable labour through au-
tomation may seem socially desirable. On the other hand, this raises
questions about what kinds of obligations farmers – and nations – have
to individuals whose labour has subsidized agriculture for decades. It
also raises questions about broader social justice and livelihood issues
globally. In 2012, SAWP remittances to Mexico alone totaled $174
million with workers remitting almost $10,000 per trip, upwards of
80% of their total seasonal income (Wells et al., 2014). In our work-
shop, the interdisciplinary scholars noted that Western neoliberal po-
licies, such as NAFTA, have resulted in the extraction of resources and
the creation of landless poverty in countries like Mexico, which has
generated a surplus of exploitable migrant labour. Rather than in-
creasing compensation and improving working conditions for migrant
labourers, however, the capitalist fix incentivizes farmers to simply
replace them with automation. From the perspectives of migrant
workers and labour activists, robots and other automation technologies
will replace their jobs, deepening precarious poverty and making life
even harder for migrant workers.
As vulnerable forms of low-skilled migrant labour are being re-
placed by automation technologies, the literature also shows that a
qualitative shift in farm labour is occurring where a larger number of
high-skilled employment opportunities are becoming available for do-
mestic post-secondary graduates (Ontario Agricultural College, 2017;
RBC, 2018). As farming operations integrate sensors, robotics and de-
cision support systems, farmers require support for programming di-
gital systems and software, machine and hardware maintenance, as well
as agronomic knowledge, and even potential assistance with accessing
capital funding (e.g. writing grant applications). With the rise of digi-
talization, work in the ag-food sector now requires a much more
technologically savvy skill-set, which is already creating a gap between
labour needs and labour supply. As another dairy farmer who uses ro-
botics notes:
We have suggested it several times at our local community college to
have a course on agricultural electronics … We need somebody who
is trained on how these systems are put together … Even the robot,
there are electronics on there that have never given us a whole lot of
trouble, but there are sensors that do fail. Our principal dealer has
had training on what sensors fail, and he knows exactly where to
look. He is looking for a guy to help him and he hasn't found any-
body yet. He basically has to train the right person himself.
Many farmers are looking to build and design equipment and sensor
systems themselves through technologies like Raspberry Pi. A small
organic hops farmer, who was engaged in this type of activity, predicted
that,
I'll probably work with one of the locals here who does software
design and get a bunch of Raspberry Pi units so that we can take the
information from the drying process. What I want is temperature, air
flow and humidity on each of the different floor-levels, and in the
conditioning space. I want to be able to control my entire system so
that, while we're doing all of our harvest work, I can know with a
certain degree of satisfaction and reliability that the system is also
protecting my end-product so it reaches the highest quality para-
meters possible. It's so simple, it's binary: turn this off, turn that off,
or downgrade the speed of something … That is the end game. All
the on/off switches and gauges are simply right there so that all we
need to do is throw in a few more controls. It could also be wifi'ed to
my computer in the house, so everything gets sent over.
This farmer explained that if he can automate slightly and double
his acreage to 20 acres, he could dramatically reduce the time and
manual labour required for processing and handling his crop—which
includes harvesting, pelletizing and bagging the hops. These technolo-
gies are reducing the need for short term, manual labour that performs
the “heavy lifting” of agriculture by replacing these jobs with a reduced
number of highly-skilled full-time positions.
In this context, farmers had ongoing concerns about how shifts in
skills – and skill demands – are impacting labour availability. In order
to build in-depth knowledge and understanding of the specific farm
context, many farmers need workers who are able to come back to the
same farm year after year, but who do not expect year-round, on-farm
employment. This is a significant driver for hiring migrant workers over
domestic workers, as domestic workers are typically seeking long-term,
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permanent full-time employment rather than seasonal employment. For
domestic workers, farm employment is typically a temporary stop-gap
rather than an annual commitment. Farmers thus noted that govern-
ment policy and program support for migrant worker skill-building in
the areas of digitalization and automation may be beneficial for farmers
and workers alike.
However, without such shifts in policy, digitalization and automa-
tion will likely have adverse impacts on migrant worker employment.
For instance, if seasonal agricultural worker policies seek to improve
pay and working conditions for migrant farm workers without also
attending to broader political issues (e.g. immigration reform, skills
training and capital support), migrant labour displacement will be ex-
acerbated by farmers replacing labour through automation. At the same
time, social divides will likely emerge across the farm population
concerning technological access—something we have already seen with
older digital technologies. Pre-existing infrastructure access issues—-
such as poor broadband internet availability—may be coupled with a
lack of comfort with emerging technologies, technology trust issues, a
perceived lack of use for farming, and disparities between technological
availability and engagement to exacerbate inequities (Warren, 2004;
Briggeman and Whitacre, 2010; Aubert et al., 2012; Hennessey, Lapple
& Moran, 2016; Pant and Hambly Odame, 2016). As Basu and
Chakraborty (2011) demonstrate, longstanding racial inequities, gender
differences, and disparities in farm size affect access to technologies.
We know, as a result of the 2016 Census of Agriculture in Canada, that
larger, more capital intense farms are currently adopting digital ag tech
at significantly higher rates (Duncan, 2018), even while some farmers
continue without consistent access to basic broadband technologies
(Duhatschek, 2018).6 For example, in more marginal locales where
migrant labour is not easily accessed, and where there are more sig-
nificant farm labour shortages, digital technologies may not be a matter
of displacing current labour per se, but rather about farmers without
infrastructural resources to access, implement, and monitor new digital
technologies. As such, this highlights other forms of agricultural mar-
ginality.
The third theme observed in the data is that digitalization is creating
what we call a new ‘sharecropping of agricultural data’. Data produc-
tion technologies such as smart tractors require a system of data man-
agement to transform the data into useful outputs for farmers. Only
then can data become an effective knowledge and decision-making tool.
Many of these technologies are linked to specific data management
platforms. The rise of these farm data management platforms such as
Climate Field View mean that, while farmers still own the fields, they
are effectively renting their data. In this sense, farmers and farm
workers continue to carry the material risks and bear the livelihood
impacts of agriculture while the capital gains of digitalization are,
largely, extracted by data management companies. Indeed, agricultural
data have significant use value because they are an essential tool for
these companies' platform and predictive algorithm development. As
with capitalist modes of banking, farmers deposit their data (money)
into the system. These data are then used (reinvested) by the companies
to make a profit.
In effect, some farmers are becoming ‘digital labourers’, while data
management companies accumulate the economic benefits via the ex-
pansion of their knowledge systems—the new digital commodity. This
is similar to the capital accumulation models of social media platforms
such as Facebook and Google (Fuchs, 2018). Such user labour is yet
another form of unpaid work under digital capitalism, raising the
question of how this may allow corporations (and the web of digital
agricultural support industries) to capture even more profits from the
agri-food production chain (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009; Howard, 2016).
One dairy farmer voices reluctance concerning the benefits of their data
production for farmers:
Everything is connected to the internet, I don't think you have any
control over it anymore. That is a tricky one right, because like I said
they [data management companies] have access to everything, yet
we still get the bills all the time. So when do we get to issue a bill
and get a little bit of a kick-back for the information that we are
generating on a daily basis? Because, the supplier companies are like
‘we need to find our R&D programs, to make it better for you guys’.
But every time you make a new investment then the price of your
equipment just went up because now it is the newest, latest,
greatest, so you figure you [the company] can charge another 10%
or another 5% or whatever amount it might be. So, you [the com-
pany] took all my information to do that.
Meanwhile, larger farmers in particular have noted the value of
remote sensors and irrigation for maximising efficiencies as well as the
leverage that real-time market and weather data provide for grain crop
negotiations, leaving ‘supersized farms’ more empowered than ever
before (Bunge, 2017, 2018). Within this context, future research might
consider the possible implications of these shifts in power for more
marginalized actors in the system, such as racialized and migrant farm
workers?
5. Discussion
5.1. The socio-political landscape of agricultural labour amid digitalization
In both the workshops and interviews, participants were asked to
reflect on how they foresee labour shifts and digitalization impacting
social actors in agriculture. The key takeaway is that while digitaliza-
tion is supporting farmers and companies to advance productivist, ex-
port-oriented agriculture, there are concerns that this will occur at the
expense of labour equity and fairness. Participants noted that, without
adequate political shifts, vulnerable groups like racialized migrant
workers are likely to be most heavily impacted by labour disruptions
caused by digitalization.
By briefly reflecting on the political structure and trajectory of
Canadian agriculture, we gain valuable insight into the logic of this
concern. While a comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this
paper, a number of studies have effectively assessed the socio-political
and racial structures that underpin Canadian agriculture (Carter, 1990;
Holtslander, 2015; Laliberte and Satzewich, 1998; Preibisch, 2007;
Thobani, 2007; Walia, 2010). This scholarship illustrates that the agri-
food system has been built on and through structures of settler colo-
nialism wherein white settler privilege over agricultural lands and re-
sources resulted directly from the dispossession, dislocation, and ex-
ploitation of Indigenous lands and peoples alongside the maintenance
of a landless pool of heavily exploited racialized and/or migrant labour.
So, while many small and medium sized farmers have become in-
creasingly economically oppressed by corporations in the food sys-
tem—which may be exacerbated with the rise of sharecropping of
agricultural data—economic oppression exists within a larger system of
settler colonialism. In light of this, settler colonialism ought to be better
integrated into academic and political discussions of labour moving
forward since labour restructuring most often works in the interests of
those who have shaped the larger system through which this (re)
structuring operates. It is worth noting, after all, that Canada placed a
series of often insurmountable barriers in the way of Indigenous farmers
specifically. These included the pass and permit systems, which effec-
tively barred Indigenous farmers from selling their own farm produce
or even leaving the reserve without the permission of a settler Farm
Instructor or Indian Agent. As Carter’s (1990) work has made clear,
these barriers effectively ensured the failure of Indigenous agricultural
enterprise on the Canadian prairies and, in the process, provided a
cheap labour pool for white settler farmers. Acknowledging the settler
6 Pant and Hambly Odame (2016), in their consideration of broadband in
Eastern Ontario, note that in some farm contexts, digital technologies may
provide local jobs while also reducing environmental costs.
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colonial structure of contemporary agriculture helps to remind us that
racialized and Indigenous peoples again face the potential for further
marginalization through processes of labour restructuring and digita-
lization.
The reasons for the continued exploitation of racialized and
Indigenous peoples under agricultural digitalization are directly related
to how labour exploitability has been structured in the agri-food sector
over time. As a representative of an Indigenous food organization ar-
gues,
We have Indigenous people here that could go to nearby farms and
develop reciprocal working relationships in agriculture. Many
Indigenous communities nearby would love that work, but we
cannot compete because the seasonal agricultural workers program
is so heavily supported and assumed as status quo. Foreign labour is
now just so heavily exploited for the growth of agriculture.
This statement illustrates how Indigenous and migrant labour has
been transposed in Canadian agriculture according to different socio-
political conditions of exploitation and expansion over time. For in-
stance, as Indigenous farm workers began to demand better working
conditions under the ‘grab-a-hoe Indian’ program, it became more dif-
ficult for farmers to exploit Indigenous labour (Carreiro, 2017). Rather
than focusing on creating more socially just agricultural labour pro-
gramming in partnership with Indigenous peoples, the government re-
focused its efforts on expanding the migrant worker program so as to
capitalize on the exploitability of foreign labour; which now makes up
half of the horticultural labour in Ontario (Wells et al., 2014). Indeed,
the ‘foreignness’ of migrant workers has long been used to defend
hyper-exploitation (Sharma, 2006), which can also be framed in terms
of cultural, racial, and socio-economic factors. For example, one farmer
notes, “The labour force is a huge bottleneck that is only going to get
worse. I find here, it is very very hard to get reliable help. It doesn't
matter what you seem to pay. It doesn't change the work ethic of society
these days.” Multiple farmers argued that racialized migrant workers
are simply ‘harder workers’ who are ‘better suited’ to farm conditions
(see also, Bélanger and Candiz, 2014), while ‘Canadians’ (which we
may take to mean white settler citizens), ‘don't want to do this work’.
5.1.1. How is the socio-political landscape shaping agricultural
digitalization and labour realities?
Agribusiness firms are largely driving ag-tech development, and
these private companies have largely focused on farmer capitalization,
with scarce support for labour welfare (McMichael, 2013). In the pro-
cess of technological advancement then, ag-tech companies are unlikely
to produce technologies directed at improving migrant farm labour
conditions and training, especially if farmers can instead be convinced
to further capitalize by adopting technologies that displace labour. In
other words, current economic conditions lock employers (who are, in
this case, farmers) into a decision between retaining manual workers or
replacing them with technology. Under these conditions, a company
would not be compelled to develop technologies that improve migrant
labour conditions or support—fair and effective—integration of labour
into increasingly automated farm systems. So, while farmers noted a
desire to engage in labour up-skilling, mentorship, and cooperative
labour pooling as well as collectivized/cooperative automation, these
practices largely work against the economic objectives of the ag-tech
industry. Moreover, historical and current trajectories indicate that the
economic benefits of integrating labour equity into digitalized farming
systems would not be accrued by the employer. Rather, such an ap-
proach might increase the economic costs for farmers because their
labour expenses may remain the same while their equipment costs rise.
After all, public programming is not focused on building migrant
workers' ‘tech-savvy’ skills, and new technologies in agriculture have
not demonstrated a focus on making their working lives safer or more
pleasant. For now, the primary focus for developers seems to be off-
setting the need for migrant workers altogether.
As agricultural technology evolves, it is clear that manual labour
opportunities will decline alongside a rise in technological design and
management opportunities. Within this political and economic context,
who then will be able to access such opportunities, and how? If suffi-
cient public support is not provided for vulnerable groups to access
material resources and training, they are likely to be further margin-
alized across the sector, and the economy more broadly. This, we argue,
is of fundamental concern.
Pertaining to the issue of ‘skill’ specifically, recent employment re-
ports show that those with greater resources available to prepare and
adapt to labour shifts in the new ‘skills economy’ will likely ‘win out’
(RBC, 2018). Another report notes that, “many workers will need to
upskill or retrain as their roles evolve to incorporate AI - one positive is
that for employees who are highly skilled in tech there will be many
opportunities to progress and develop. As their skillset becomes more
sought after, there will also be a greater case for higher salaries”
(Jobbio, 2018, p. 6). The recent Advisory Council on Economic Growth
report supports this projection and argues that ‘soft’ digital skills are the
fastest growing job-related needs, such as critical thinking, and social
and emotional intelligence. The report also states that “technological
innovations will heavily affect groups already underrepresented in the
labour market.” As a result,
… there is an economic and social imperative to raise workforce
participation among Indigenous people, lower-income workers,
women with young children, Canadians over the age of 55, and
persons with disabilities. That task will become all the more difficult
as technology replaces many of the jobs people in these groups
currently perform[…]the global job-loss rate among women will be
double that of men over the next five years as automation heavily
disrupts office and administrative roles that are largely filled by
women (Advisory Council on Economic Growth, 2017)7
Our data support this projection and indicate that employment
opportunities in the field of digital technologies are increasingly ac-
cessed by privileged populations, raising questions of equity for those
who do not have access to the skills needed to thrive in the new
economy. For example, neither policy nor technology has advanced
public access and monitoring to ensure that migrant farm workers are
being treated well on farms. And, while the technology is theoretically
available to provide this information, we still know very little about the
conditions for migrant farm workers. For instance, while the
Occupational Health Clinics for Ontario Workers (OHCOW) have re-
cently established a program to educate migrant farm workers and
employers about on-farm health and safety, there is no government-
mandated monitoring of migrant worker health. As a labour re-
presentative argued, “occupational health is an important issue. There
are no protections around pesticides and chemicals or around providing
bathrooms on farms, or health and safety. There are no specific reg-
ulations, and that's also because of the influence of employer organi-
zations.” From this perspective, we can predict that digital agricultural
technologies will be applied in the service of companies and—to a
lesser degree—farmers, without being used to address the needs of
vulnerable migrant farm workers themselves.
5.1.2. The spatial effects of digitalization for labour and rural communities
Finally, the data reveal pertinent spatial features of digitalization for
labour and rural communities. Firstly, our data confirm recent research
that has shown how lower levels of education and skills in rural areas
disempower agricultural workers and impact their capacity to adopt
emerging technologies (Salemink et al., 2017). Additionally, while
automation technologies are being developed to serve small-scale and
niche producers as well as large commodity farmers, economic
7We want to note that while the gender dimension is beyond the scope of this
paper, it is an important and under-researched concern.
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conditions in agriculture continue to facilitate farm scale growth and
farmland consolidation. This trajectory is occurring alongside the in-
crease in demand for workers with more flexible, digital skills, which
together support rural-to-urban migration. That said, this trend does
not hold true in all rural communities.
In some rural communities, an urban-to-rural exodus is occurring as
a result of high urban real estate prices along with the rise in ICT (i.e.,
telecommunications and remote opportunities) and the expansion of
broadband networks (Pant and Odame, 2016). As a result, as noted in a
U.S. study by Nelson et al. (2014), some rural communities are ex-
periencing an influx of in-migration from baby boomers and im-
migrants, which has stimulated expansion in auxiliary sectors like
construction, restaurants, and housekeeping. The authors argue that, in
these communities, migrant workers provide the labour flexibility
needed to support shifting demand. Further, they identify this labour as
essential to the economic development of these rural “amenity desti-
nations,” but note that this influx of flexible labour is largely benefitting
local employers while still marginalizing migrant workers.
Similar dynamics are emerging in some rural areas of Canada.
Wealth and demographic disparities across the Niagara Region of
Ontario illustrate this. For instance, the rural revitalization of destina-
tions such as Niagara-on-the-Lake (NOTL) stand in stark contrast to the
poverty experienced by large numbers of migrant workers who are
living on the outskirts of Virgil, Ontario—a small rural community just
6 km down the road from NOTL.
Niagara-on-the-Lake has become an upscale tourist destination re-
plete with many fine dining and retail outlets. It attracts thousands of
visitors annually through promoting its arts and cultural events and
historic sites. In contrast, Virgil is a residential community nestled next
to large-scale winery, tender fruit, and nursery operations. Due to its
proximity to such companies, it is often a preferred destination for
migrant labour housing. In fact, the gentrification of the Niagara-on-
the-Lake community relies on the impoverishment of temporary migrant
workers who reside nearby, but not, of course, within NOTL.
Gentrification in NOTL is deeply dependent on local tender fruit and
grape production, as local wine and cuisine are central drivers of
tourism and economic development. In order to accumulate the capital
necessary for gentrification, these primary industries often require
cheap, migrant labour. Specifically, migrant worker exploitation allows
for the tender fruit and wine industries as well as auxiliary sectors to
thrive and grow, which is vital to the gentrification process of Niagara-
on-the-Lake. Within this context, there is a need for research that spe-
cifically examines how the economic dynamics in rural communities
like NOTL might impact agricultural labour as digitalization evolves.
While the fate of towns like Virgil remain to be seen, gentrified areas
like NOTL will likely need less migrant labour in the future. Will Virgil
then be absorbed into the gentrified area, or will it fall further into rural
isolation as the community of migrant workers are no longer needed?
Similarly, how might ongoing racial and cultural tensions in rural
communities impact agricultural labour as digitalization evolves?
Farmer respondents referred to growing social conflict in rural com-
munities between settler residents and migrant farm workers. As one
farmer notes, “you go to Simcoe on a Thursday or Friday and the whole
town is full of other ethnicities … there is a bunch of workers from
Jamaica. At some point during that evening there will be some alter-
cation between an idiot who's from Simcoe an idiot who is from
Jamaica.” Such tensions elucidate the ‘discomfort’ felt by white settler
culture in interacting and sharing space with racialized peoples (e.g.
many local residents avoid shopping when racialized migrant workers
have time off and are out and about in town) and reveal the ongoing
imaginary of rural spaces as white settler spaces (Bonds and Inwood,
2016; Gahman, 2016; Panelli et al., 2009; Rotz, 2017). We wonder then
how these racial tensions may influence farmers in their decision to
displace migrant labour for automation, and how migrant labour dis-
placement will impact the social and economic landscape of many small
(and struggling) rural communities. In Leamington, for instance, a town
of only 27,000 people, temporary migrant workers contribute ap-
proximately $15 million per year in economic activity and have
transformed the local economy (Mojtehedzadeh et al., 2017).
6. Conclusion: the future of digital agriculture and labour
restructuring
This paper has explored digital agricultural technologies and their
potential implications for agricultural labour and rural communities.
We acknowledge that digitalization and automation stand to sig-
nificantly improve the lives of farmers and workers who can afford and
utilize these technologies, while creating new agricultural employment
opportunities in the digital agricultural sector. However, these benefits
sit uneasily with historical processes of exclusion, digital and otherwise,
by governments, corporations, and those who are able to fully exploit
the benefits of new developments in agriculture. This struggle may be
even more pronounced in more marginal locations where labour
shortages intersect with poor digital infrastructure and asymmetrical
power relations between tech corporations, landowners, and farm la-
bourers—a dynamic that can be better understood through further
empirical analysis.
We also know, however, that farmers who are deploying digital
agricultural technologies are doing so to build their enterprise and to
survive in an increasingly competitive industry. This is not inherently
negative, but it does have important implications for the future—and,
we argue, is an important topic of prospective research. These tech-
nologies are being deployed to advance their economic profits, rather
than to improve the lives of more precarious and vulnerable groups in
the sector. In particular, digitalization may further propel capital flows
from workers to farmers, between farmers (according to their scale of
capital accumulation) and from farmers to agribusiness companies and
their digital assemblages. Much like in any period of technological
transition, there will be winners and losers. While the opportunities for
tech savvy, flexible workers in particular are promising, it is essential to
consider who exactly is able to access these opportunities, and who is
not. Concerning policy, instead of focusing on how we can curtail the
need for labour altogether, we must consider what our collective role is
in improving the lives and opportunities of the most vulnerable workers
in the industry.
While the digitalization and automation of agriculture may lead to
net job losses for low and unskilled workers, it may also lead to ever-
more marginalization and exploitation of those lower-skilled migrant
labourers for whom there are still jobs. More pointedly, it appears that
the technophilic promise of agtech will likely displace existing agri-
cultural labour hierarchies with a radically bifurcated labour market,
where on the one side, highly-skilled, highly-trained workers use digital
agricultural technologies to increase productivity and find evermore
efficiencies, while on the other side, lower-skilled workers in the fields,
greenhouses, processing plants and warehouses are subject to increased
employer scrutiny and surveillance, further rationalization of their
workplaces, and ever-escalating expectations of productivity. Lessons of
digitalization and automation from other sectors are instructive in this
regard. For example, the rapid automation of retailing through internet
shopping has created an array of new types of warehouse jobs, with
workers subject to levels of workplace fatigue and employer surveil-
lance beyond anything imaginable in factory work of the industrial era
(Davis, 2014; Mojtehedzadeh and Kennedy, 2017; Soper, 2011). This
area of research remains underexplored, but we stress that it is of cri-
tical importance to agri-food studies—and critical social sciences more
broadly—moving forward.
In this sense, as digitalization evolves in agriculture, the effects on
labour are inherently politicized. While decision-makers, companies,
and governments are stressing the need for agricultural workers to
adapt to disruption in the so-called ‘digital age,’ what does ‘choice’ and
‘flexibility’ mean for vulnerable workers? What support and resources
do these populations have to allow them to participate in the ‘skills
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economy’? This dialogue continues to situate choice within the in-
dividual. As digitalization and automation forge ahead, individual
workers must then figure out how to flexible-ize themselves. This
highlights a number of ethical questions that remain unaddressed.
Primarily, what about government choice and direction?
Concerning Canadian governance, automation is reducing the number
of exploitative, precarious jobs in the ag-sector and is ‘replacing’ these
jobs with higher paid employment opportunities for domestic
University graduates. If digital technology means we trade-off ex-
ploitative, migrant jobs for better paying tech and ‘soft’ skill jobs, do we
have a moral obligation to return some of these revenues to migrant
workers and their communities, or, at minimum, provide them with
relevant training?
Policy, programming and legislation have the potential to help shift
the trajectory of digitalization in ways that support food security as well
as vulnerable agricultural labourers. Indeed, digitalization and auto-
mation could, theoretically, benefit marginalized groups. For instance,
as mentioned earlier, digitalization could be used to build transparency
around labour treatment, fairness and care.
To begin addressing concerns over labour equity and agricultural
digitalization, further research and discussions need to consider three
priority policy areas. These are not intended to be comprehensive so-
lutions, but necessary first steps:
1. Pathways to agriculture and farming for immigrants and migrant
workers. To protect racialized and migrant agricultural labourers
from being excluded from the digitalization trend in agriculture,
future research and action should seek to improve labour mobility
and immigration for these workers and develop programming for
entry into agriculture and food growing for new immigrants (in-
cluding residency, resources for starting a farm, and training op-
portunities).
2. Support for currently marginalized forms of farming, including for
racialized farmers and those who have and continue to be blocked
from agricultural enterprise. This requires attention to theories and
practices of land repatriation and labour programming for margin-
alized communities and workers in ways that build agri-food sys-
tems that are relevant to them and that integrate labour with auto-
mation (e.g., collective automation and cooperative labour pooling
for smaller farmers in particular).
3. Capacity and skill building support in rural areas for vulnerable
populations. In order to access the benefits of new digital agri-
cultural developments, there requires sufficient re-skilling and
training for marginalized and racialized labourers to support them
in developing their digital agtech skills. Research should consider
potential avenues for bringing these activities into rural commu-
nities themselves, as well as what is needed to develop rural spaces
that immigrant workers feel comfortable residing in.
Overall, we emphasize that the current enthusiasm for digital
agriculture should not blind us to ways that new technologies have the
potential, as outlined here, to intensify exploitation and deepen mar-
ginalization. Digital agriculture holds promise for improving many di-
mensions of our food system, but the possibilities for equitable, non-
exploitative agtech development need to be both enhanced and fore-
grounded in future policy and research.
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